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L INTRODUCTION
It is now generally acknowledged that a liability insurer owes
its insured the duty to make a good faith effort to settle an action
against its insured within the policy limits.' Where the insured
has purchased an excess liability policy to indemnify it against
amounts recovered in excess of the underlying or primary policy
limits, the primary insurer is responsible for paying the costs of
the defense of the action and indemnifying the insured for any re-
covery by the injured plaintiff up to the primary policy limits,
while the excess insurer is obligated to indemnify the insured for
amounts recovered in excess of the primary insurer's policy lim-
its.2 The primary insurer usually controls the litigation against the
insured through its right to designate and obligation to pay de-
fense counsel. But the excess insurer often must pay a far greater
amount than the primary insurer to satisfy a judgment obtained by
the injured plaintiff. Thus, serious questions have arisen as to the
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before the various courts of the State of New York, United States Supreme
Court and various U.S. Appellate and District Courts. Member of Anthony M.
Lanzone, P.C., New York City, New York.
** BA., 1970, City College of New York, MA, 1971, University of Michigan; J.D.,
1974, New York University School Df Law; Member of the Bar of the State of
New York, Associated with the firm of Anthony M. Lanzone, P.C., New York
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1. See, e.g., Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957);
Armot, 40 A.LR.2d 168 (1955).
2. In a typical case, the primary policy obligates the insurer to indemnify the
insured against recovery by settlement or judgment up to a specified limit,
e.g., $50,000 per occurrence. The excess policy generally obligates the excess
insurer to indemnify against the same risks as the primary policy but with
coverage limits extending from the primary policy limits up to its own limit,
e.g., from $50,000 up to $500,000 per occurrence. If recovery by one or several
claimants arising out of one covered occurrence surpasses $500,000, the ex-
cess above $500,000 is paid by the insured. An "umbrella" policy is a form of
excess policy which insures against more types of risks than are covered by
the insured's primary policy.
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primary insurer's duty to the excess insurer to settle the litigation
in good faith within the primary insurer's policy limits or to tender
its policy limits where a reasonable possibility exists that a judg-
ment may be rendered in excess of the policy limits. 3 This Article
will explore the development and ramifications of a primary in-
surer's good faith settlement obligation where the excess insurer
would be liable to pay that part of a plaintiff's judgment in excess
of the primary's limits of coverage.
Most jurisdictions hold that the primary insurer owes a duty of
utmost good faith to its insured to settle a claim within the primary
insurer's policy limits.4 In every policy of insurance, as in every
contract, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by which each party agrees to refrain from acts or omissions which
would prevent the other from receiving the benefits of the agree-
ment. Good faith and fair dealing require the insurer to effect rea-
sonable settlements of claims within the policy limits where there
is a substantial likelihood of recovery in excess of those limits.5
Liability insurance policies generally reserve to the insurer the
right to decide whether to settle or litigate to judgment a claim as-
serted against an insured.6 In determining whether to accept or
reject a settlement offer, the insurer must give the interests of the
insured at least as much consideration as its own.7 The test of the
reasonableness of the insurer's determination is whether a pru-
dent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the amount
demanded by the plaintiff for settlement of its claim.8 If the in-
3. The standard of "good faith" in negotiating settlements to which the primary
insurer must adhere is discussed at note 57 infra. Despite this good faith
obligation, the primary insurer is not a guarantor as to the results of a jury
verdict, and "it is not required to prophesy or foretell the results of litigation
at its peril." St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455,458 (10th Cir.
1951).
4. See, e.g., Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 470, 134 A.2d 223, 228
(1957); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178 (1955).
Although the term "utmost" is not generally used in bad faith cases, a sig-
nificant line of cases enunciates the principle that the insurer must act as a
fiduciary to its insured, so that the relationship between insurer and insured
goes beyond the usual contractual duty of good faith. We wish to emphasize
the fiduciary nature of this duty by using the term "utmost" good faith. See,
e.g., Kavanaugh Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116
(1976); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864
(1976).
5. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
16 (1967). See Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 NJ. 474,323 A.2d 495
(1974).
6. Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1969); Brown
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1963).
7. Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1963).
8. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Lange
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971).
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surer breaches its duty to settle in good faith within the policy lim-
its, the insured has a cause of action against the insurer for the
amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limits.9
Where an excess insurer rather than an insured is obligated to
pay that part of the plaintiffs judgment which is greater than the
primary insurer's policy limits, many courts have held that the pri-
mary insurer owes an equivalent duty to the excess insurer to ex-
ercise utmost good faith in attempting to settle the case within the
excess insurer's policy limits.' 0 Although no privity of contract ex-
ists between the primary and excess insurer, the courts have
granted a cause of action to the excess insurer for damages against
the primary insurer where the primary insurer has breached its
duty to settle litigation in good faith." The courts generally have
not created a separate and distinct duty running from the primary
to the excess insurer but instead have held that the excess insurer
is equitably subrogated to the rights of the insured against the pri-
mary insurer, whose breach of its obligation to settle claims in
good faith has caused the insured, or in its place and stead the ex-
cess insurer, to sustain damages.' 2
9. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,430-31,426 P.2d 173, 177,58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17 (1967).
10. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1978);
Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Estate of
Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 NJ. Super. 419,372 A.2d 1124 (1977);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 977,
375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1978); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68
Misc. 2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1972), a.f'd mean., 39 A.D.2d 678, 332 N.Y.S.2d
1003 (1972).
11. Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177
(1977); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 43
N.Y.2d 977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1978); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N.E.2d 568 (1952).
12. The types of misconduct underlying an action for bad faith failure to settle by
the excess insurer against the primary insurer can be illustrated as follows:
1) [A] n unreasonable refusal to settle by the primary insurer when
settlement would have been the prudent course of action;
2) [T] he primary insurer wrongfully failed to accept the settlement
advice of its own attorneys and their evaluation as to value and
liability [of the claim];
3) [T] he primary insurer failed to conduct a proper and appropriateinvestigation and ... failed to exercise the standard of care re-
quired of an insurer in investigating and defending a claim andlitigation;
4) [T]he primary insurer willfully or negligently failed to advise the
excess insurer of all material developments with regard to the
liability and settlement opportunities;
5) [T] he primary insurer demanded that the excess insurer make a
contribution to a settlement amount within the limits afforded by
the primary insurer's policy;
6) [T]he primary insurer willfully violated the fiduciary relation-
1982]
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Although the primary insurer's duty to make good faith settle-
ment efforts never varies, the excess insurer's assertion of a claim
against the primary for failure to settle in good faith arises in two
distinct factual contexts. The normal bad faith action is predicated
upon four elements: (1) the plaintiff's offer to settle within the pri-
mary policy limits, (2) the primary insurer's rejection of such offer,
(3) the subsequent judgment for an amount in excess of the pri-
mary policy limits, and (4) the excess insurer's liability to pay that
part of the judgment above the primary insurer's coverage. How-
ever, in numerous cases the factual situation is as follows: (1) the
plaintiff offered to settle for an amount greater than the primary
policy limits, (2) the settlement demand was far in excess of the
primary coverage and yet less than the potential judgment, (3) the
excess insurer concluded that the offer was reasonable and should
be accepted, and (4) the primary insurer refused to contribute its
policy limits to effectuate a settlement. In actions commenced by
excess insurers under the second factual situation, primary insur-
ers have argued either that the excess insurer's cause of action is
conditioned upon the plaintiff's offer to settle within the primary
policy limits or that the primary insurer cannot be subjected to lia-
bility in the absence of an adjudication of the insured's liability.13
The courts have consistently rejected these arguments,14 and have
established that the excess carrier need not allege the existence of
a settlement offer within policy limits, but only that the excess car-
rier offered to contribute a specific sum for which settlement could
have been made or that it offered to contribute an indefinite
amount which, together with the primary insurer's policy limits,
would have effected a settlement for an amount less than the sum
which the excess carrier was subsequently required to pay be-
cause of the primary insurer's refusal to contribute its policy
limits.15
ship and duties that existed between the insured and its excess
insurer;
7) [T]he primary insurer, in an obvious liability situation, [deliber-
ately seeks], without justification, to delay offering its [policy]
limits.
A. Lanzone, Primary Insurer's Duty to Excess Insurer, 1973 DEF. RESEARCH
INST., Excess Liability 18, 23.
13. See note 32 infra.
14. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 567 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); General Accident Fire
& Life Assurance Corp. v. American Cas. Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63,367 A.2d 864
(1976). See note 24 infra.
15. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. American Cas. Co.,
390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Inden.
Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976).
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I. EARLY CASES
The doctrine of subrogation was employed in an early line of
cases in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to permit suits
by excess insurers against primary insurers where improper con-
duct by the primary insurer resulted in payments by the excess
insurer.16 The court grounded the excess insurer's cause of action
on general equitable principles and on the subrogation clause con-
tained in the excess insurer's policy. In one case, American Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc.,17 the insured
brought an action against its primary insurer for bad faith failure
to accept an offer of settlement. The court ruled on the first appeal
that the insured was not the real party in interest since its excess
insurer had paid the judgment above the limits of the primary in-
surer's policy.18 On remand the excess insurer was substituted for
the insured on the basis of its payment of the excess amount of the
judgment and the existence of a subrogation clause in the excess
insurance policy. On a second appeal, the court held that the sub-
rogation clause enabled the excess insurer to assert an action for
damages against the primary insurer for the latter's breach of its
duty to act in good faith in considering settlements within its pol-
icy limits.19
HL EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
Recently, the courts have departed from reliance upon the
existence of a subrogation provision in the excess insurance pol-
icy2O and, instead, have articulated a fully developed theory of eq-
uitable subrogation as the basis of an excess insurer's right of
action against a primary insurer who breaches its duty to attempt
good faith settlement within its coverage limits. In Peter v. Travel-
16. Bennett v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1951); St. Paul-
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951); American Fid. &
Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951). See United
States Fd. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960);
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958).
17. 179 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951).
18. 179 F.2d at 11.
19. The court held that the substitution was proper because it "did not introduce
a new cause of action into the case." 190 F.2d at 237.
20. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (discussion of equitable subrogation by operation of law as op-
posed to "conventional" subrogation which arises under express or implied
agreement). See also Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St.
2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759 (1980).
19821
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ers Insurance Co. ,21 Travelers provided primary liability insurance
with policy limits of $250,000, while Lloyds of London issued an ex-
cess policy with limits above $250,000. As a result of confusion be-
tween the primary's home and branch offices, the primary insurer
refused to authorize any offer to settle greater than $15,000, and the
plaintiff's offers to settle within the primary policy limits were thus
refused. At trial the jury returned a verdict in the sum of $407,000.
After judgment the plaintiff agreed to accept, in compromise settle-
ment, the sum of $387,984.10, or $137,984.10 in excess of the primary
limits of $250,000.22
The excess insurer sued to recover the excess amount on the
ground that the primary insurer's breach of its duty to settle in
good faith within its policy Imits subjected the excess insurer to
liability for $137,984.10. The court, first considering the question of
the primary insurer's liability to its insured under the facts
presented, concluded that the primary insurer refused to give
"meaningful consideration" to settlement and breached its duty by
failing "to give any adequate consideration to the settlement pros-
pect."23 The court then considered whether the primary insurer's
breach of duty to its insured was actionable by the excess insurer
and held that the excess insurer's cause of action was based upon
the doctrine of equitable subrogation and was subject to compli-
ance with its requirements. 24 The court found that the excess in-
21. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
22. Id. at 1348.
23. Id. at 1349. The Peter court relied upon the criteria enunciated in Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), for deter-
mining the good faith of an insurer in negotiating settlements and found a
more significant breach of duty by Travelers in Peter than occurred in Crisci
because "the failure even to consider the question of what settlement would
be reasonable is a breach of greater proportion than the refusal of a reason-
able offer." 375 F. Supp. at 1349.
24. The Peter court stated that the elements of an insurer's cause of action based
upon equitable subrogation are:
(1) The insured has suffered a loss for which the party to be
charged is liable, either because the latter is a wrongdoer whose
act or omission caused the loss or because he is legally respon-
sible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer;
(2) [T] he insurer, in whole or in part, has compensated the insured
for the same loss for which the party to be charged is liable;
(3) [T]he insured has an existing, assignable cause of action
against the party to be charged, which action the insured could
have asserted for his own benefit had he not been compensated
for his loss by the insurer;
(4) [T] he insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omis-
sion upon which the liability of the party to be charged depends;
(5) [J]ustice requires that the loss should be entirely shifted from
the insurer to the party to be charged, whose equitable position
is inferior to that of the insurer; and
(6) The insurer's damages are in a stated sum, usually the amount
[Vol. 61:259
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surer met all such requirements and was therefore equitably
subrogated to its insured's cause of action for damages against the
primary insurer. It further stated that strong equitable and eco-
nomic factors compelled the judicial recognition of the duty owed
by a primary to an excess insurer to settle claims in good faith
within the primary insurer's policy limits. The court observed:
An insurance company's duty to act in good faith in settling claims within
its policy limits is well established and is reflected in its premiums. That
an excess insurer may recover from the primary for a breach of duty does
not increase the duty or the liability of the primary. Under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation,,the duty owed an excess insurer is identical to that
owed the insured. ... In considering whether it will settle a claim, the
primary insurer may consider its own interests, but it must equally con-
sider the interests of the insured, which become the interests of the ex-
cess insurer by subrogation.25
The Peter court also noted that the primary insurer's control of the
litigation and settlement negotiations makes the interests of the
excess insurer dependent upon the primary insurer, while the pri-
mary insurer is rarely affected by the existence of excess coverage.
For example, a finding that the insured's purchase of excess liabil-
ity insurance absolved the primary insurer from its good faith duty
to settle would have the dual adverse effects of placing potentially
severe financial constraints upon the excess insurer, resulting in
higher premiums, and reducing the primary insurer's incentive to
settle when an injured plaintiff's demand hovered near the pri-
mary insurer's limits. 26 These problems are obviated where the
excess insurer may enforce by equitable subrogation the duty to
settle in good faith owed by the primary insurer to its insured.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Reserve Insurance Co.,27 expanded upon the Peter rationale for the
it has paid to its insured, assuming the payment was not volun-
tary and was reasonable.
375 F. Supp. at 1350 (quoting Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Con-
str. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (1967)). Subsequent
cases have eliminated from the doctrine of equitable subrogation any re-
quirement that the insured sustain actual loss. "It is not a prerequisite to
equitable subrogation that the subrogor suffered actual loss; it is required
only that he would have suffered loss had the subrogee not discharged the
liability or paid the loss." Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,
76 Cal. App.-3d 1031, 1044, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 423 (1978).
25. 375 F. Supp. at 1350. Accord, Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies,
148 N.J. Super. 419, 423-24, 372 A.2d 1124, 1126-27 (1977).
26. For example, if the liability policy limits were $20,000, plaintiffs demand were
$18,000, and liability was likely but not certain, the primary insurer might de-
cide to risk a jury verdict in the-absence of a duty by the primary to the ex-
cess carrier since the primary's only risk in refusing the demand would be
$2,000 together with higher attorney's fees. See Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1045, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 423 (1978).
27. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
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duty which the primary insurer owes to the excess insurer to nego-
tiate settlements in good faith.28 The court stated:
When there is no excess insurer, the insured becomes his own excess in-
surer, and his single primary insurer owes him a duty of good faith in pro-
tecting him from an excess judgment and personal liability. If the insured
purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess insurer for
himself. It follows that the excess insurer should assume the rights as
well as the obligations of the insured in that position.2 9
The court recognized that the scope of the primary insurer's duty
to settle claims in good faith is not dependent upon whether the
insured had sufficient foresight to obtain an excess liability policy.
Irrespective of whether the insured purchased excess insurance,
the primary insurer will be held to the same high standard of good
faith in considering settlement offers.
The court identified two significant policy considerations which
compelled the creation of a cause of action in equitable subroga-
tion by the excess against the primary insurer. First, a primary
insurer who breaches its duty to settle in good faith within its pol-
icy limits "imperils the public and judicial interests in fair and rea-
sonable settlement of lawsuits."3 0 The excess insurer's cause of
action by virtue of equitable subrogation acts to constrain the pri-
mary insurer from rejecting settlements in bad faith. Second, the
excess insurer's ability to enforce the primary insurer's duty to
settle in good faith rectifies what would otherwise be an unfair dis-
tribution of losses between the two insurers. The court observed:
The insured has paid for two distinct types of coverage, undoubtedly at
different rates because they involve different amounts and kinds of risks.
Primary coverage is designed to cover liability from zero to certain policy
limits (in this case $50,000); excess coverage is designed to cover liability
only after those initial limits are exhausted.
3 1
The excess insurer's equitably subrogated claim against the pri-
mary insurer safeguards the excess insurer from losses which it
may sustain by reason of the improper conduct of the primary in-
surer who has control over settlement negotiations. 32 It insures
28. Continental involved an excess insurer who settled the underlying claim dur-
ing trial for a sum above the primary policy limits and paid the full amount
thereof while the primary insurer refused to participate in the settlement.
Subsequently, the excess insurer sued the primary to recover the primary's
policy limits of $50,000 which the excess insurer contended was withheld
from the settlement negotiations in bad faith. Id. at 7, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
29. Id. at 8-9, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
30. Id. at 9, 238 N.W.2d at 864-65.
31. Id. at 9, 238 N.W.2d at 865.
32. The Continental court soundly rejected the primary's contention that the ex-
cess insurer could not recover because there had been no adjudication of the
liability of the insured in light of the settlement reached during trial by the
excess insurer. The court held that the primary's bad faith failure to settle
occurred prior to trial, and since the decision not to settle was to be evaluated
[Vol. 61:259
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that the essential purposes of the different coverages and their rat-
ing structures will not be thwarted by the primary insurer's casting
of the excess insurer into liability through a breach of duty to set-
tle claims in good faith. The Continental rationale for the judicial
recognition of an excess insurer's equitably subrogated cause of
action has met with approval in subsequent decisions.
The court in Valentine v. Aetna Insurance Co.3 3 held that ex-
cess insurers were equitably subrogated to the insured's rights
against the primary insurer and were entitled to assert claims
against it in the sum of $200,000, which represented the difference
between the $700,000 jury verdict and the $500,000 amount for
which the original action could reasonably have been settled. The
court advanced many of the same cogent policy considerations
cited by the Continental court, stating:
[If the existence of excess insurance relieved a primary insurer of its re-
sponsibility to negotiate and settle up to its policy limits in good faith,
then the primary insurer would have a disincentive to settlement. More-
over, if during settlement negotiations the primary insurer is allowed to
force the excess insurer to cover part of the primary's insurance expbsure,
the coverages and rate structures of the two different types of insurance-
primary and excess-would be distorted, and excess insurance premiums
would have to be adjusted. On the other hand, allowing an excess insurer
to enforce a primary carrier's duty to negotiate and settle in good faith to
the full limits of theprimiary carrier's policy does not add to or change
that carrier's duties.Xro
Most decisions have held that the excess insurer's measure of
damages is the difference between the amount of the adverse judg-
ment against the insured and the amount for which the claim could
reasonably have been settled. 35 However, in a case where the po-
at the time it was made, the primary could not demand an adjudication of the
insured's liability as a prerequisite for the assertion of a bad faith cause of
action. Id. at 11-14, 238 N.W.2d at 866-67. In a similar factual setting, the court
in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976),
upheld the excess insurer's cause of action for damages sustained by reason
of the primary's failure to tender its policy limits. The court held that the
insured or the excess insurer by equitable subrogation could
proceed to make a prudent good faith settlement for an amount in
excess of the [primary] policy limits and then, upon proof of the
breach of the insurer's obligation and the reasonableness and good
faith of the settlement made, to recover the amount of the policy lim-
its from the [primary] insurer.
Id. at 75, 367 A.2d at 870.
33. 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. I& at 298.
35. It is settled that recoverable damages for the failure of an insurer to
effect reasonable settlement within its policy limits includes the en-
tire amount of the insured's liability to the injured claimant, even
though that amount be in excess of the insurer's policy limits....
And we entertain no doubt that an excess insurer which has settled
and discharged the insured's liability, may recover from the primary
1982]
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tential judgment against the insured was greatly in excess of the
primary policy limits, the plaintiff made a demand for an amount
greater than the primary policy limits, and the primary insurer re-
fused to contribute its policy limits towards the settlement, the
court held that the excess insurer, who had settled the action for
$135,000, was entitled to recover up to the primary insurer's policy
limits of $50,000.36 The basis for the decision was that the excess
insurer suffered no loss greater than the amount of the primary
insurer's policy limits since it was responsible for contributing the
difference between the primary policy limits of $50,000 and the set-
tlement amount of $135,000. Thus, where the excess insurer settles
a claim for a reasonable amount, it is entitled to damages resulting
from the primary insurer's bad faith only by reason of the primary
insurer's refusal to contribute its policy limits towards the
settlement.
Although the clear trend of the law is to recognize the excess
insurer's equitably subrogated cause of action, its development
has not gained unanimous support in all jurisdictions. A minority
view holds that in the absence of a direct contractual relationship,
the primary insurer owes the excess insurer no duty to settle in
good faith. In Universal Underuriters Insurance Co. v. Dairyland
Mutual Insurance Co.,37 the Arizona Supreme Court disallowed a
bad faith cause of action by an excess against a primary insurer on
the grounds that no privity of contract existed between the two in-
surance companies. It is noteworthy, however, that despite the
court's refusal to permit a bad faith action by the excess carrier, it
allowed recovery by the excess against the primary insurer on the
grounds that "where two companies insure the same risk and one
is compelled to pay the loss, it is entitled to contribution from the
other."3 8
insurer an amount in excess of the primary insurer's policy limits if
the excess insurer can prove the primary insurer's unreasonable re-
fusal to settle within its policy limits resulted in loss to the excess
insurer in an amount in excess of the policy limits of the primary
insurer it would not otherwise have had.
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1049-
50, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 426 (1978) -(citations omitted).
36. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976).
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Coronet Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 3d 744, 358 N.E.2d 914
(1976); Evans v. Continental Cas. Co., 40 Wash. 2d 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952).
37. 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967).
38. Id. at 520, 433 P.2d at 968. This case was said to be a controlling statement of
Arizona law and a bad faith claim by an excess against a primary insurer was
thereby denied in Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 452
F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 362, 150 N.W.2d 233 (1967); Smoral v. Hanover Ins.
Co., 37 A.D.2d 23, 322 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
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An excess insurer's enforcement of the primary insurer's duty
to settle litigation in good faith has widespread ramifications, as
discussed in the following subsections.
A. Duty of Primary to Excess Insurer Where Insureds are not Identical
The cases discussed above pertain to a "true" primary-excess
insurance relationship, where one insured has procured primary
liability and excess liability policies from two different insurers.
However, in Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers' Insur-
ance Group,39 the court considered the good faith duty to settle
concept in a different setting. The issues before the court were:
(1) whether a permissive user of an automobile who was listed as
an insured under the owner's liability insurance policy had a right
of action against the owner's insurer for its bad faith refusal to ef-
fect settlement within its policy limits, and (2) whether the per-
missive user's automobile liability insurer, whose coverage was in
excess of the owner's coverage,4° was equitably subrogated to the
permissive user's cause of action where it had been required to
pay the excess amount of a judgment rendered against the insured
as a result of the owner's insurer's bad faith refusal to settle. The
court held that although the permissive user was not a party to the
contract, he was "one of a class for whose benefit the policy was-
expressly made,"4 1 and was therefore an express third-party bene-
ficiary.42 The court concluded that the permissive user could en-
force the owner's liability insurance policy, including the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to effect reasonable
settlements.43
The owner's insurer argued that the distinction between the
factual situation at bar and a "true" primary-excess insurance rela-
tionship required the court to deny to the permissive user's in-
surer equitable subrogation to the rights of the permissive user.44
Its contention was that in a "true" primary-excess relationship, the
two different policies have been issued at premium rates struc-
tured to reflect the difference in exposure, so that a "true" excess
carrier should be permitted to rely upon the .primary's good faith
efforts to settle claims within the primary insurer's policy limits.
45
39. 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978).
40. The owner's liability insurance was found to be primary insurance under
CAL. [INs.] CODE § 11580.9(d) (West 1972). 76 CaL App. 3d at 1038, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 418.
41. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 1042, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
42. Id
43. Id. at 1042, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
44. Id. at 1046-47, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
45. Id. at 1047, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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In contrast, under the Northwestern facts, since each insurer was a
primary insurer to its own insured, it was argued that it was unrea-
sonable to place the burden of settlement entirely on one of the
insurers. Moreover, the owner's insurer argued that since both in-
surers had a separate duty to their own insureds to effect reason-
able settlements in good faith, the permissive user's insurer
should not be relieved of its duty by asserting claims against the
owner's insurer for its refusal to settle.
The court carefully analyzed the rights and obligations of each
insurer and upheld the cause of action asserted by the permissive
user's insurer, as an excess insurer, against the owner's insurer, as
the primary insurer, for the primary's bad faith refusal to settle.
The court reasoned that both insurers knew that under existing
insurance statutes their respective policies would constitute pri-
mary coverage in some cases and excess coverage in others, and
both were able to set their premium rates in order to reflect this
economic and legal reality. Although the permissive user's insurer
owed the duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured, the per-
missive user was an insured under the owner's policy, which the
court characterized as primary insurance. Thus, the owner's in-
surer owed a duty to the insured to attempt a good faith settlement
of the claim against the permissive user. However, the court held
that the excess insurer's duty to settle "requires no more than that
it effect reasonable settlement within its own policy limits."4 6 The
court concluded:
Permitting an excess insurer to recover from the primary insurer for its
unreasonable failure to settle within its policy limits, in no way reduces or
diminishes the duty of the excess insurer to settle within the limits of its
own policy. Neither does it in any way discourage settlements. However,
denying recovery, that is, relieving a primary insurer of its duty to effect
reasonable settlement where excess coverage exists, would tend to deter
settlements. 4 7
The duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by the excess insurer
to its insured is consistent with and complementary to the excess
insurer's enforcement of the primary's duty to the insured to make
46. Id. at 1048, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
47. Id. (emphasis in original). In a similar factual situation, the court in Farm-
ers' Ins. Group v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Mich. App. 474, 269 N.W.2d 647
(1978), held that the permissive user's liability insurer was subrogated to the
rights of its insured pursuant to the subrogation provisions of the excess pol-
icy and was entitled to assert a cause of action against the owner's insurer
who had wrongfully denied coverage on the grounds that the owner's policy
had been cancelled. Although the court confusingly identified the action by
the permissive user's insurer as one of "indemnification," it correctly ana-
lyzed the situation in terms of subrogation theory. See also St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951); Smoral v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
37 A.D.2d-23, 322 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
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reasonable settlements in good faith. The Northwestern decision
was a proper extension of the adoption of equitable subrogation by
an excess insurer of the insured's rights against a primary insurer.
If the permissive user's insurer had no cause of action against the
owner's insurer, the incentive to the owner's insurer (primary in-
surer) to settle cases would be significantly reduced. The poten-
tially diminished incentive for settlement is contrary to the policy
considerations underlying the judicially enforced duty of good
faith of an insurer toward his insured. The recognition of the eq-
uitably subrogated cause of action by the permissive user's insurer
is an effective means to encourage the primary insurer to comply
with its good faith obligation to attempt to make settlements.
Moreover, the court recognized the interface between law and eco-
nomics by pointing out that the primary insurer charged premiums
in anticipation that certain cases would arise in which the owner's
policy of insurance would be considered primary and other cases
in which the policy would be considered an excess policy so that
each insurer's premiums could be adjusted in accordance with its
anticipated exposure in different circumstances.
B. Duties of Insured to Excess Insurer
Two conflicting California appellate cases, and their resolution
by the California Supreme Court, have clarified, in that state, the
duty owed by an insured to its excess carrier to settle litigation. In
Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp. ,48 an engineering firm, Spink,
obtained primary coverage from the insurer up to $100,000 with a
$15,000 deductible and excess coverage from Transit Casualty
under an "umbrella" policy up to $1,000,000. Both policies con-
tained a standard clause permitting the insured to refuse to con-
sent to a settlement. When a wrongful death action was brought
against Spink, charging negligent supervision of a construction
site, the owner of the project cross-claimed against Spink for its
alleged negligence in failing to effect the inclusion of a hold-harm-
less clause in the prime construction contract and to have the pro-
ject owner listed as an additional insured on the prime contractor's
liability and workmen's compensation policies. Prior to and at the
commencement of the trial, the plaintiff offered to settle for a total
sum of $300,000, including a $76,000 contribution from Spink, which
would have been within the primary policy limits. The defense at-
torneys designated by the primary insurer recommended this set-
tlement to Spink, and while the primary insurer favored the
48. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979). Transit Casualty was overruled
in Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,
610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
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settlement, it did not place any pressure on Spink to accept it.
However, Spink stated that it would not settle "under any circum-
stances," 49 and the primary insurer failed to advise the excess in-
surer of Spink's refusal to settle.
After a jury verdict was rendered in the sum of $632,000, the
trial court held Spink liable to the project owner on its crossclaim.
The ultimate result of the trial was that Spink paid $15,000, the pri-
mary insurer, $100,000, and the excess insurer, $175,000. The excess
insurer contributed $285,000 to settle other claims and then
brought an action against the insured and the primary insurer al-
leging their bad faith refusal to settle the wrongful death action
within the primary policy limits.50 The appellate court stated that
the application of equitable subrogation would defeat the excess
insurer's bad faith claim against the primary insurer because a
subrogee has no greater rights than a subrogor and the insured
Spink acted in bad faith in refusing to settle the wrongful death
action within the primary policy limits. However, the court held
that the excess insurer's compliance with the requirements of eq-
uitable subrogation was not an indispensable element of its claim
for damage against the primary insurer. The court stated: 'The
law, then, would be unrealistic in demanding that either carrier
use the policyholder as its stepping stone to the assertion of a mu-
tual obligation to each other. Triangular reciprocity is far more ra-
tional."51 In positing a theory of triangular reciprocity of good faith
duties among the insured, primary, and excess carriers, the court
stressed the delictual rather than contractual nature of a claim
grounded upon a bad faith failure to settle and reasoned that each
of the three parties should be held responsible in a bad faith action
in accordance with the measure of its own fault.52
The court held that a policy provision which permitted an in-
sured to reject settlements tended to defeat the public interest in
the settlement of litigation and would be narrowly construed in or-
der to give full effect to the implied covenant of good faith and fair
49. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 364. Testimony revealed that Spink
had consulted its insurance broker, who advised that a settlement by Spink
would impair its future insurability and that of the engineering profession in
general. Id.
50. Since the excess insurer also paid $285,000 to settle other wrongful death and
injury claims arising out of the same accident, part of its claim against the
insured and primary insurer was that their failure to settle the first action
when plaintiff had demanded $300,000 increased the settlement value of the
other death and injury claims. Id. at 130-31, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
51. Id. at 133, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
52. In an analogy to comparative negligence, the court intimated that if the plain-
tiff in a bad faith action had itself acted in bad faith in failing to settle an
underlying action, its recovery would be proportionately reduced. Id. at 134,
156 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
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dealing in every policy.53 The court concluded that, despite the
presence of the settlement rejection clause, the insured could not
unreasonably withhold its consent to settle, and the burden at trial
was upon the insured to prove that its refusal to settle was reason-
able under all the circumstances, including the insured's concern
for its professional reputation.5 4
In the second California case involving an insured's duty to its
excess carrier, Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. ,55 the excess insurer brought an action against the in-
sured and primary insurer based upon their alleged failure to set-
tle a claim in an amount less than the $100,000 liability limit of the
primary insurer's policy.5 6 The excess insurer alleged two causes
of action, one in negligence and the other for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The excess insurer contended that the
insured and primary insurer could have settled the claim for
$60,000 or less, that they had a duty to'the excess insurer to settle
for less than $100,000 when they had an opportunity to do so, and
that as a result of their failure to settle, a judgment was obtained
by the underlying plaintiff for $125,000, of which the excess insurer
was required to pay $25,000. The court held that the excess insurer
failed to state a cause of action either in negligence 57 or for breach
of contract.
While the court recognized that an insurer may be liable to the
insured where it has breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by unreasonably rejecting a settlement offer
within the policy limits, the court expressly refused to make such
53. Id. at 135-36, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
54. Id. at 136, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
55. 158 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Ct. App. 1979), affd, 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1980).
56. The insurance coverage was unusual in that the insured was a self-insurer for
a layer above the primary policy and below the excess policy. The insurance
coverage was as follows: (a) Travelers Insurance Company and Travelers In-
demnity Company insured Safeway with policy limits of $50,000; (b) Safeway
insured itself for liability between the sums of $50,000 and $100,000; and
(c) Commercial Union Assurance Companies and Mission Insurance Com-
pany provided coverage in excess of $100,000 to $20,000,000. 26 Cal. 3d at 915-
16, 610 P.2d at 1040, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
57. In Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973), the
court held that an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing must be based upon bad faith, and that an allegation of negli-
gence alone is insufficient to impose liability. Most courts have held that bad
faith requires more than negligence, and "imports a dishonest purpose, moral
obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulte-
rior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces actual
intent to mislead or deceive another." Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221,224,404 N.E.2d 759,762 (1980) (citing Slater v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962)).
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duty reciprocal by extending to the excess insurer a cause of ac-
tion against its insured based upon the breach of such duty. The
court reasoned that although both parties to an insurance contract
must observe the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
the content of the insured's duty depends upon the nature of the
"bargain struck" between the parties and their "legitimate expec-
tations" arising from the contract.58 In a conventional liability in-
surance policy, the insurer, in exchange for the payment of
premiums, undertakes to provide defense of lawsuits and indemni-
fication in order to protect the insured from liability. The insured
is justified in expecting that in carrying out its contractual obliga-
tions, the insurer will act in good faith in attempting to effectuate
settlements. While the basis of the insurance contract is to give
the insured the security that the insurer will hold the insured
harmless in the event of litigation by reason of the risk covered by
the insurance policy, the gain which the insurer seeks from this
bargain is the premium paid by the insured, so that the insurer has
no anticipation or expectation that the insured will act to minimize
the financial loss to the insurer by reason of the insured's failure to
agree to a reasonable settlement. For the insured, the basis of the
insurance policy is his legitimate expectation that the insurer will
act in good faith to make settlements in order to minimize the
financial risk to the insured of any claim covered under the policy.
However, the excess insurer has no legitimate expectation that its
interests will be similarly protected by an insured. The purpose of
excess insurance is to provide the insured with additional re-
sources and thus shield it from personal liability if recovery
against the insured is greater than a specified sum. Therefore, the
court reasoned, the insured has no duty to consider the interests of
the excess insurer as it would its own, and the insurer has no legit-
imate expectation that the insured will do so.59 The court stated:
The insured owes no duty to defend or indemnify the excess carrier;
hence, the carrier can possess no reasonable expectation that the insured
will accept a settlement offer as a means of "protecting" the carrier from
exposure. The protection of the insurer's pecuniary interests is simply
not the object of the bargain.60
The court criticized the Transit court's theory of triangular reci-
procity by stating that it failed to consider the disparity of bargain-
ing power between the insured and the insurer and the difference
in the legitimate contractual expectations of each of the parties.
The court concluded that the insured's duty of good faith and fair
dealing with its excess insurer did not compel it to accept a settle-
58. 26 Cal. 3d at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
59. Id. at 918-19, 610 P.2d at 1041-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
60. Id. at 919, 610 P.2d at 1041-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
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ment even where it was likely that an adverse judgment would re-
quire payments under the excess policy.
On appeal, the court of appeals' opinion in Commercial was
adopted with only minor changes by the California Supreme
Court.6 1 In dealing with the conflict between Commercial and
Transit as to the scope of the insured's duty to an excess insurer,
the supreme court disapproved Transit insofar as it held that an
insured's duty of good faith and fair dealing encompassed the duty
to accept settlements where there was a likelihood that a judgment
against the insured would cast liability on the excess insurer.62
The supreme court wholly incorporated the lower court's rationale
that the insured owed no such duty to the excess insurer to settle
claims in order to protect the excess insurer's financial interests.
C. Standards for Finding Bad Faith by Primary Insurer
Several courts have considered the factors determinative of a
primary insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle cases within its
policy limits. In Centennial Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,63 the primary insurer issued a policy with limits of
$300,000 per occurrence, and the excess insurer furnished coverage
above $300,000 up to $5,000,000 per occurrence. The underlying ac-
tion was settled for $700,000 after an adverse jury verdict, and the
excess insurer claimed that the primary insurer had acted in bad
faith in refusing to settle. The court permitted the excess insurer's
action by approving the doctrine of equitable subrogation but held
that the excess insurer did not prove that the primary insurer had
acted in bad faith. The court noted that the primary insurer had
conducted a thorough investigation of the claim, had apprised the
excess insurer regularly concerning the status of the action, had
permitted the excess insurer access to its files, and had engaged in
extensive settlement negotiations which resulted in a plaintiff's
61. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610
P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
62. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043,164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North
Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979), held that
both the insured and primary insurer owed the excess insurer the duty of
good faith and fair dealing and that the excess insurer could recover from its
insured if it proved that the insured and primary insurer fraudulently col-
luded to assign dates of loss on malpractice claims to policy years other than
those in which the losses actually occurred. The Kaiser court expressly lim-
ited its holding to the facts presented and did not venture to define the ambit
of the insured's duty to the excess carrier. The supreme court in Commercial
cited Kaiser with approval for the principle that "the insured's status as such
is not a license for the insured to engage in unconscionable acts which would
subvert the legitimate rights and expectations of the excess insurance car-
rier." 26 Cal. 3d at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
63. 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759 (1980).
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demand of $275,000 and in the primary's offer of $250,000. The ex-
cess insurer argued that bad faith was shown by the primary in-
surer's request that the excess insurer contribute the $25,000
difference between the offer and demand, since $275,000 was within
the primary policy limits. The court rejected the argument, hold-
ing that the primary insurer's request for contribution was by itself
insufficient to prove bad faith and that only the primary insurer's
insistence upon contribution from the excess insurer as the condi-
tion of settlement would warrant a finding of bad faith. A mere
request for contribution is only one fact to be considered in the
court's determination as to the primary insurer's bad faith. In gen-
eral, a finding of bad faith will not be supported merely by evi-
dence of negligent conduct; the concept of bad faith has been
interpreted to contain the element of willful conduct.
In North River Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co.,64 the
court held that the excess insurer had not proven as a matter of
law that the primary insurer had acted in bad faith and so left un-
disturbed the trial court's verdict in favor of the primary.65 The
court, applying South Dakota law, declared that a bad faith claim
against a primary insurer must be grounded upon misconduct
more serious than error in judgment, lack of foresight, or negli-
gence, although negligence was one factor in the determination of
bad faith.66
Similarly, in Valentine v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,67 the
court held that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in ruling
that the primary insurer did not act in bad faith in its failure to
notify the insured or excess insurer in a timely manner of plain-
tiff's repeated increases to its ad damnum clause.68 Although hold-
ing that the failure to notify was negligent conduct which
prejudiced the insured's position, the court concluded that such a
showing of negligence was legally insufficient to prove bad faith.
64. 600 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1979).
65. The primary insurer, whose policy limits were $150,000, refused to offer more
than $93,000 to settle an action, which resulted in a judgment rendered
against the insured for $500,000. Id. at 723.
66. The court also found that the excess insurer failed to prove that the primary
insurer's bad faith was the proximate cause of the excess insurer's damage.
Id. at 724-25.
67. 620 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1980).
68. The injured plaintiff had instituted its action against the insured in May, 1970,
seeking $25,000 in damages. In May, 1972, the trial judge allowed an increase
in the demand contained in the complaint to $100,000. After a mistrial, the
court permitted the plaintiff again to increase its ad damnum clause to seek
recovery of $750,000. The primary insurer did not give notice of these in-
creases to its insured or to the excess insurer until a subsequent trial was
held in June, 1973, which resulted in a judgment in excess of the primary
limits. Id. at 584.
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In denying recovery to the excess insurer as equitable subrogee of
the insured, the court pointed to the fact that no proof had been
adduced that the failure to give notice was motivated by a "selfish
purpose"69 to protect the primary insurer's interest at the expense
of the insured. Since the primary insurer's negligent conduct was
not actuated by a harmful or venal intent, the court held that the
excess insurer in proving negligence did not meet the higher stan-
dard of "bad faith."70
D. Prejudicial Settlements by Primary Insurer
Recent opinions reaching inconsistent results have examined
the excess insurer's right of action against a primary insurer where
the primary insurer has settled with the original plaintiff in a man-
ner that exposed the excess insurer to liability. In American Home
Assurance Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,71 the primary
insurer with policy limits of $300,000 settled with two injured plain-
tiffs for $214,000; however, the plaintiffs reserved their rights to con-
tinue their claim against the insured and excess insurer for
amounts over and above the $300,000 primary policy limits. The
excess insurer thereafter assumed the defense of the action and
settled for $62,500. Subsequently, it sued the primary insurer on
the basis of equitable subrogation and unjust enrichment asserting
that the claims could have been fully settled within the $300,000
policy limits. The court denied recovery on both theories, stating
that the excess insurer's payment to the plaintiffs was in settle-
ment of its own liability, not that of the primary insurer, so there
was no basis for subrogation.72 Moreover, since each insurer set-
tled with plaintiffs by reason of its own policy and therefore its
own exposure, no claim could be maintained that the primary in-
surer had been unjustly enriched.73
In Elas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,74 the
plaintiff, insured, and primary insurer entered into a court-ap-
proved settlement in which the primary policy limit of $20,000 was
paid to the plaintiff in return for an agreement to hold the insured
and primary insurer harmless against recovery above the primary
policy limits, while reserving plaintiff's rights against the excess
insurer.7 5 The excess insurer disclaimed coverage, refused to de-
69. Id. at 586.
70. Id.
71. 379 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
72. 379 So. 2d at 758.
73. Id.
74. 39 Il1. App. 3d 944, 352 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
75. This was a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident in
which the owner's insurer acted as primary insurer and the driver's policy
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fend the insured, and did not participate in the nonjury trial which
resulted in a $100,000 judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court
held that the insured and the primary insurer were entitled to
make a partial settlement with the plaintiff to protect their own
interests where the excess insurer refused to participate in the de-
fense of the action and therefore breached its obligations under
the polcy.76 It is significant that the court limited the excess in-
surer's liability to its policy limits of $30,000, rather than the entire
excess judgment, on the grounds that the parties to the settlement
relied upon a specific amount of excess insurance. The Elas court
found the settlement to be a proper response to the breaches of the
policy committed by the excess insurer.
An opposite result was reached in United States Fire Insurance
Co. v. Lay,77 where the excess insurer brought a declaratory judg-
ment action against the primary insurer, the insured, and the ad-
ministratrix who was the plaintiff in a wrongful death action, in
order to be relieved of liability for the judgment rendered in favor
of the administratrix. The primary insurer, whose policy coverage
was up to $100,000, negotiated a settlement in which it paid $70,000
and was released from any further payments as a result of any
judgment. The settlement provided that if a judgment was ren-
dered in excess of $100,000, the primary insurer and insured "were
to 'be given credit' of $100,000 on the judgment 'and any verdict or
judgment in excess of. . ($100,000.00) . . . [would] be marked sat-
isfied within available insurance coverages.' "78 Subsequently, the
administratrix filed a wrongful death action against the insured,
which was defended by the primary insurer, and an agreed judg-
ment was entered in the sum of $150,000.79
The court, in reviewing the provisions of the excess policy,
found that the excess insurer was liable only if the insured sus-
tained a loss in excess of the primary policy limits of $100,000.
Since the pre-litigation settlement agreement released the insured
from liability in excess of $70,000, the insured could not sustain
losses in excess of the primary limits; thus the obligation of the
constituted excess insurance. The driver's insurer disclaimed coverage on
the ground that the automobile which the driver had in operation at the time
of the accident was excluded from coverage by the policy. Id. at 945-46, 352
N.E.2d at 61.
76. Id. at 948, 352 N.E.2d at 63.
77. 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978).
78. Id. at 422. The settlement agreement also recited that except for the "credit"
of $100,000, the intention of the parties was not to release any claims the ad-
ministratrix held against any parties other than the primary insurer. Id.
79. The excess insurer knew of and participated in the negotiating of the agreed
judgment but was not a party to that agreement. The court found that it was
not estopped and did not waive its right to contest its obligations to pay the
unsatisfied portion of the judgment. Id.
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excess insurer to indemny its insured did not arise.8 0 The court
held that the excess insurer's liability was extinguished by the set-
tlement which released its insured from liability for any amount
above the settlement figure of $70,000. The court disapproved of
the attempted prejudice to the excess insurer's rights, stating:
A settlement for less than the primary limit that imposed liability on the
excess carrier would remove the incentive of the primary insurer to de-
fend in good faith or to discharge its duty... to represent the interests of
the excess carrier. Here the primary insurer had no incentive whatsoever
to reach a settlement at a figure between $70,000 and $100,000.81
E. Recovery of Defense Costs
There is a wide split of authority as to the liability of the pri-
mary insurer to the excess insurer for defense costs and attorney's
fees in the underlying action where the primary has wrongfully re-
fused to participate in the defense of the insured. In two cases, the
courts denied recovery against the primary on the grounds that
both the primary and excess policies independently obligated each
insurer to defend its insured and to pay the costs of defense.82
One court stated: 'The duty to defend is personal to each insurer.
The obligation is several and the [excess insurer] is not entitled to
divide the duty nor require contribution from [the primary] absent
a specific contractual right."83
Other courts have permitted recovery of defense costs by the
excess against the primary insurer on the grounds that the pri-
mary is obligated in the first instance to defend its insured and
must not be allowed, by a wrongful refusal to defend the insured,
to place the burden of such defense upon the excess insurer.8 4 In
Farmers Insurance Group v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,85
the court recognized the split of authority as to an excess insurer's
80. Id. at 423. The court held that the agreed judgment did not purport to impose
liability upon the insured and in fact, the wrongful death action instituted by
the administratrix was a "sham" since neither the insured nor the primary
insurer which purported to defend the action, had any interest in its disposi-
tion. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1960); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1971).
83. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir.
1960).
84. Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 340 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich.
1972); Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27,366 P.2d 455,17 Cal.
Rptr. 12 (1961); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Underwriters, 34 Ill. 2d 424, 216
N.E.2d 665 (1966); National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 14 Utah 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963). See General Accident Fire & Life As-
surance Corp. v. American Cas. Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1980).
85. 84 Mich. App. 474, 269 N.W.2d 647 (1978).
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recovery of attorney's fees and held that the "better rule" was to
allow recovery of defense costs as part of the rights to which the
excess insurer is equitably subrogated. The court reasoned: "To
hold otherwise, would encourage insurers to deny coverage and
subsidize refusal to defend. Unless attorney fees can be recovered,
insurance companies might profit by unscrupulous tactics." 86
Thus courts will penalize a primary insurer for a wrongful failure
to provide a defense for the insured by allowing the excess insurer
to recover defense costs through the mechanism of equitable
subrogation.
IV. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PRIMARY AND
EXCESS INSURERS
The insurance industry has attempted to resolve the various
problems which arise between primary and excess insurers when
claims are asserted against their insured by promulgating a set of
standards, designated the Guiding Principles, 87 to govern each in-
surer's rights and obligations. These principles provide:
(1) The primary insurer must discharge its duty of investigating
promptly and diligently, even those cases in which it is apparent that its
policy limit may be consumed.
(2) Liability must be assessed on the basis of all the relevant facts
which a diligent investigation can develop and in the light of applicable
legal principles. The assessment of liability must be reviewed periodically
throughout the life of the claim.
(3) Evaluation must be realistic and without regard to the policy limit.
(4) When, from evaluation of all aspects of a claim, settlement is indi-
cated, the primary insurer must proceed promptly to attempt a settle-
ment, up to its policy limit if necessary, negotiating seriously and with an
open mind.
(5) If, at any time it should reasonably appear that the insured may be
exposed beyond the primary limit, the primary insurer shall give prompt
written notice to the excess insurer, when known, stating the results of
investigation and negotiation and giving any other information deemed
relevant to a determination of the total exposure, and inviting the excess
insurer to participate in a common effort to dispose of the claim.
(6) Where the assessment of damages, considered alone, would reason-
ably support payment of a demand within the primary policy limit, but the
primary insurer is unwilling to pay the demand because of its opinion that
liability either does not exist or is questionable and the primary insurer
recognizes the possibility of a verdict in excess of its policy limit, it shall
give notice of its position to the excess insurer, when known. It shall also
make available its file to the excess insurer for examination, if requested.
(7) The primary insurer shall never seek a contribution to a settlement
within its policy limit from the excess insurer. It may, however, accept
86. Id. at 486, 269 N.W.2d at 653.
87. Claims Executives Council, American Ins. Ass'n & American Mut. Ins. Alli-
ance (1974) (on file at the Nebraska Law Review). See A. Lanzone, Primary
Insurer's Duty to Excess Insurer, 678 INs. L.J. 382, 399-400 (1979).
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contribution to a settlement within its policy limit from the excess insurer
when such contribution is voluntarily offered.
(8) In the event of a judgment in excess of the primary policy limit, the
primary insurer shall consult the excess insurer as to further procedure.
If the primary insurer undertakes an appeal with the concurrence of the
excess insurer, the expense shall be shared by the primary and the excess
insurer in such manner as they may agree upon. In the absence of such
an agreement, they shall share the expense in the same proportions that
their respective shares of the outstanding judgment bear to the total
amount of the judgment. If the primary insurer should elect not to appeal,
taking appropriate steps to pay or to guarantee payment of its policy limit,
it shall not be liable for the expense of the appeal or interest on the judg-
ment from the time it gives notice to the excess insurer of its election not
to appeal and tenders its policy limit. The excess insurer may then prose-
cute an appeal at its own expense, being liable also for interest accruing
on the entire judgment subsequent to the primary insurer's notice of its
election not to appeal If the excess insurer does not agree to an appeal, it
shall not be liable to share the cost of any appeal prosecuted by the pri-
mary insurer.
(9) The excess insurer shall refrain from coercive or collusive conduct
designed to force a settlement. It shall never make formal demand upon a
primary insurer that the latter settle a claim within its policy limit. In any
subsequent proceeding between excess insurer and primary insurer, the
failure of the excess insurer to make formal demand that the claim be set-
tled shall not be considered as having any bearing on the excess insurer's
claim against the primary insurer.8 8
There has been criticism of the Guiding Principles on the grounds
that they impair the excess insurer's rights while they create new
obligations which do not at present exist by contract or common
law. For example, Principle 8 states that if the primary insurer
elects not to appeal an adverse judgment, and tenders its policy
limit, it will not be liable for the expense of the appeal, or interest
on the judgment from the time it gives notice to the excess insurer
of its election not to appeal. This proposition is directly contrary to
the decision in Fidelity General Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance
Co.,89 which held that an excess insurer was equitably subrogated
to the rights of the insured against the primary insurer for the cost
of an appeal from an adverse judgment, where there were reason-
able grounds for appeal and the primary refused to take such ap-
peal. The court held that the nature of the excess policy made
secondary the excess insurer's obligations with regard to an ap-
peal and that the primary insurer held the obligation to take an
appeal in circumstances where such appeal was reasonable.
Another departure from insurance industry practice and well
established judicial principles is Principle 9, which demands that
the excess insurer refrain from making formal demands upon a
88. Guiding Principles, Claims Executives Council, American Ins. Ass'n & Amer-
ican Mut. Ins. Alliance (1974) (on file at the Nebraska Law Review).
89. 27 A.D.2d 932, 278 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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primary insurer to settle a claim within the primary's policy limit,
and the disregard of such demand in any subsequent proceedings
between the primary and excess insurers. Principle 9 attempts to
change dramatically the common practice of excess insurers to
make such demands for settlement within policy limits upon the
primary insurers, as well as to deprive primary insurers from as-
serting the doctrines of waiver and estoppel where the excess in-
surer has made no such demands. The Guiding Principles, in
seeking to make the relationship between the excess and primary
insurers more amicable and less adversarial in nature, seek to
modify, and in certain cases, severely limit the rights and remedies
of both the primary and excess insurers.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts have developed the doctrine of equitable subroga-
tion to permit an excess insurer to enforce its insured's rights
against a primary insurer who has breached its duty to effectuate
settlements in good faith. The courts have utilized this doctrine to
redress the unfair and prejudicial situation in which a primary's
bad faith refusal to settle causes damage to the excess insurer who
cannot control the settlement negotiations in the underlying ac-
tion. In so doing, the courts have clearly understood the disparity
between the position of the primary and excess insurers in the
management and control of litigation, in negotiation of settle-
ments, and in the respective premiums charged for each policy. A
primary insurer who places its own interests higher than those of
the insured and the excess insurer will generally be liable for dam-
ages when the excess insurer bears the brunt of the primary in-
surer's failure to settle in good faith. The rationale of the courts in
recognizing this principle is that it will encourage settlement and
minimize those instances in which the primary insurer will breach
its duty of good faith to its insured and the excess insurer.
Although the courts have made substantial progress in the di-
rection of recognizing the duty of the primary insurer to an excess
insurer, further principles need enunciation with regard to the
duty of good faith existing between the insured, the primary in-
surer, and the excess insurer. When a claim is asserted against the
insured, the rights and interest of the insured, the primary insurer,
and the excess insurer become enmeshed, and it is clear that only
the judicial recognition of the interdependence between these
three parties will assure that the high standard of good faith will
be maintained so that the public policy goals of reasonable settle-
ments of claims will be upheld. We believe that the initial attitude
of the California intermediate appellate court, recognizing a tri-
partite duty between the insured, primary, and excess insurer sets
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forth a more realistic expression of rights and duties that would be
more conducive to the prompt disposition of litigation. Until this
tHipartite, reciprocal duty is given judicial support, the interrela-
tionship of the rights and duties of these three parties will remain
largely undefined.
